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Abstract 
Financial markets from New York to London and Tokyo are still reeling from 
the most severe crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. At the center 
of the crisis are complex structured credit products and innovative financial 
instruments which have enjoyed a boom during the deregulation era of the last 
ten years. Deregulation was first promoted in President Ronald Reagan’s 
economic policy, known as “Reaganomics,” in the 1980s. Since then, there 
has been less government oversight of the financial markets. This lack of 
regulatory oversight has not only been restricted only to the U.S.; markets 
across Europe and Asia have also enjoyed the “hay-ride” without caring about 
the long-term consequences. A decade of deregulation has resulted in more 
opaque financial markets in many respects, with lightly regulated or nearly 
unregulated innovative investment instruments. This paper shows that the 
growth of unregulated financial innovation, facilitated by reckless 
deregulation, has made the markets less transparent and less stable, leading to 
the recent financial crisis. It discovers the link between Reaganomics 
deregulation and the growth of financial innovation. It explains how financial 
innovation in the markets, without an adequate supervisory and monitoring 
system, led to the meltdown in global financial markets, including Asia-
Pacific markets. 
 





The most recent financial crisis, spearheaded by defaults in the U.S. mortgage market in 
2007, has caused widespread disruption to the global financial system. The lack of 
liquidity and a credit crunch in the market forced a host of uncalled-for adjustments in 
the financial markets around the globe. Starting with the U.S. market, it did not take long 
to engulf markets from Europe to Asia. Bear Stearns acquisition by JP Morgan Chase, 
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Lehman Brothers’ filing for bankruptcy protection under Chapter Eleven, and the 
purchase of Merrill Lynch by the Bank of America were just the tipping point, 
culminating in huge bail-outs being doled out by governments around the globe. Since 
then, the list of affected banks and financial firms has continued to grow. 
The crisis is in sharp contrast with the growth and expansion of the financial 
markets in the past decade, especially after the dotcom bubble burst in 2000. While US 
and European financial markets enjoyed unprecedented growth, the bonanza was 
relatively muted in East Asia, especially Japan, which had a hard time coming out of a 
long post-bubble recession. Japan, however, learned some of the lesson early on due to 
its experience in dealing with the post-bubble malaise. But it was trapped in the current 
crisis before it could put its house fully in order. There is an urgent need to understand 
the underlying forces that were responsible for all this, so that our societies are better 
prepared and protected in future. In the following section, we present a detailed cross-
sectional diagnosis of the issue. 
In general, the growth and expansion of the global financial markets has been 
characterized by innovative financial engineering products like asset-backed securities 
(ABS), collateralized debt obligations (CDO) through the securitization of mortgages, 
and consumer and corporate loans; and by new financial intermediation such as special 
purpose vehicles (SPV), structured investment vehicles (SIV), etc. Such financial 
innovation was welcomed by market participants, as it was believed to spread credit 
risks, lower financing costs, and attract fresh capital. The Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association (SIFA 2008) reported that the U.S securitization market 
was worth around $10.7 trillion in 2007; most of the growth occurred in mortgage-
backed securities (MBS), whose volume almost tripled between 1996 and 2007, to $7.27 
trillion. 
 However, financial innovation, which drove this growth, has in its own right 
contributed to instability and chaos in the financial markets. The balance sheets of large 
banks are now burdened by their holding of a large quantity of complex structured 
securities which have suffered large declines in value and liquidity, especially those 
backed by sub-prime mortgage loans. The lack of transparency in the market raised 
concerns among investors about credit risks and their real exposure to securities backed 
by sub-prime mortgages, leading to investors’ withdrawal from markets. This downward 
spiral resulted in a lack of liquidity and a credit crunch in the market, forcing further 
disruption in the financial system. 
  Financial deregulation played a fundamental role in the rapid growth of financial 
innovation during the last two decades. Since deregulation was first promoted in the 
1980s by President Reagan, many regulatory and supervisory regimes have been 
removed, necessitating market self-regulation and discipline. The abolition of the Glass-
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Steagall Act and the “no requirement of permission” by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) for higher leverage level in investment banks are the most 
poignant examples that spearheaded this barrage of financial deregulation and lack of 
oversight. The issue of regulating innovative instruments was raised among regulatory 
bodies and scholars during this time, but the hands-off approach was maintained in many 
sectors of the financial market, such as the derivatives market, hedge funds and off-
balance-sheet entities (OBSE). These deregulations contributed to the financial euphoria 
of the last decade.  
The relationship between the pace of financial liberalization and the growth of 
structural finance explains the convergence between deregulation, as part of 
Reaganomics, and the growth of financial innovation. It explains how financial 
innovation in the market, without adequate supervisory and monitoring systems, led to a 
meltdown in global financial markets as a consequence of unbridled financial expansion. 
Due to constraints of space, we shall limit the discussion here to innovative instruments 
that are now at the center of the current market turmoil, such as the structured credit 
products ABSs, CDOs, CDSs and OBSEs. It will focus the analysis of the financial crisis 
on the U.S. market, where almost all of these innovative financial instruments were 
invented and widely used. And while we trace the origins of the problems in the U.S. 
market, its impact – direct and indirect – upon the markets in Europe and Asia will also 
come into focus at times. 
The consequences and lessons from this saga are far more important for Japan 
than for any other country, as no other single economy is so deeply connected and 
intertwined with the U.S.’s. It is no secret that ups and downs in the U.S. economy, 
short-term or long-term, impact the Japanese economy. That interconnection is also due 
to large-scale investment by Japanese individuals and companies in US financial and 
housing markets in particular and in other sectors in general. That causes the direct 
impact of US economic policies on Japan. It should not been seen as mere coincidence 
that the 1980’s bubble in Japan evolved around the same time as Reagonomics was 
shaping the U.S. financial landscape; Japanese markets and governments were quick to 
copy. Hence, it is of great importance to understand U.S. financial policies and their 
evolution in order to understand the likely impact they may have on economies that are 
connected to its performance. 
 
The Meltdown – A Perspective 
 
Since the sub-prime crisis broke out, serving as a precursor of the much larger global 
financial meltdown to follow, studies on the crisis have been mushrooming. However, 
most studies discuss only the superficial causes of the current financial crisis, whereas 
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we think the root cause of the problem goes further and deeper. In this section, we 
attempt to take into account the most important and relevant studies on the causes and 
consequences of the recent financial crisis, and we attempt to explain their insufficiency 
in explaining the recent financial chaos. 
Because of the complexity of structured credit products and their far-reaching 
impact upon the global financial markets, there are diverse arguments as to the root of 
the crisis. However, there is a broad consensus that complex innovative financial 
instruments were one of its major sources. Right before the crisis, Hamilton et. al. 
(2007) opined that growth of financial market activities across the globe in the last 
decade was fuelled by rapid financial innovation, but did offer any evidence of the 
formal linkage mechanism. The Credit Risk Transfer report (Basel 2007) concluded that 
structured credit products have become more and more complex. As a result, they are 
hard for market participants to value. Criado and Rixtel (2008) note that such hard-to-
value complex instruments led to big losses on banks’ balance sheets. Brunnermeier 
(2008) stated that the employment of OBSE conduits and SIVs increased the opacity of 
financial markets. The Global Financial Stability Report (2007) explained that due to the 
complexity and lack of transparency of those products, financial markets around the 
world have become more volatile and unstable. However, those reports did not cover the 
growth of such financial innovation before the crisis, nor the impetus behind its growth.  
Nouriel Roubini (2008) presented ten shortcomings of the financial system and 
its regime of regulation and supervision. He commented that the market was becoming 
increasing opaque due to lighter regulation and lax supervision of banking and non-
banking institutions. Schacht (2008) discussed the inadequacy of the prudential 
regulatory framework and supervisory system. In the proposal for reforming the 
supervision of financial markets, U.S. Treasury Secretary Paulson (2008) also 
acknowledged the overlap of regulatory bodies and the inefficiency of the current 
regulation system. Nevertheless, there remains no full discussion of deregulation in the 
financial market in the last decade and its contribution to the meltdown.  
The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (2008) and the Financial 
Stability Forum (2008) attributed the crisis to the significant erosion of market discipline. 
According to their analysis, there was widespread complacence about risks among 
investors. But the deregulations in the financial markets in the past years are not 
discussed sufficiently in these reports. Kregel (2008) argued that the deregulations of the 
financial system since the 1970s, leading to the deterioration of lending standards in 
mortgage lending, underpinned the turmoil in the financial market. Emilios (2008) 
argued that the loss aversion of investors in the sub-prime crisis led to further turmoil in 
the market.  
While it is evident from the above material that many people saw smoke rising 
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from the overheated innovative financial markets, few were able to identify the exact 
cause and trace it back both in technical and historical terms. So far there is a lack of 
discussion about the growth of financial innovation during this deregulated era, as well 
as its contribution towards the erosion of market discipline. We, however, see a 
connection between the growth of complex financial innovation and the deregulation of 
financial markets and the economy spearheaded by economic policies and doctrines 
referred to as Reaganomics. We shall attempt to answer how such innovation took root 
and was allowed to grow in more lightly regulated markets. Moreover, we will explain 
how the transformation from the traditional bank lending model to an “originate-to-
distribute” (OTD) model, including the employment of financial engineering products 
and off-balance-sheet vehicles, led to a deterioration in lending standards and excessive 
leverage in the financial system. 
It is obvious from the following chart how closely connected are land price 
trends in Japan to the era during which Reagonomics and consequent market 
deregulation took place in the U.S.  
The case of the real-estate market is of particular relevance because most of the capital 
in financial markets in the U.S. or elsewhere flows through the real-estate market. Also, 
real-estate market finance was a major driver of most of the financial innovation taking 
place during this time. It is necessary for all backward and forward linkages that shaped 
the current times and circumstances to be discussed. 
 
Figure 1: Land Prices in Japan 1974 - 2007 
 
Source: Japan Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Land Price Data 
 
Reaganomics and the Growth of Financial Innovation 
 
Free-market economic policies promoted by consecutive U.S. regimes provided stimulus 
for the growth of the largest economy in the world (The Economist, October 11, 2008). 
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In the 1980s, President Reagan called for reducing the government’s role in the economy, 
later referred to as Reaganomics. Here we shall discuss the recent growth of financial 
innovation to discover the footprints of deregulation and the hands-off policy of 
Reaganomics in the financial market in the past ten years. This will substantiate our 
argument that financial innovation has its roots in Reaganomics, which later played a 
pivotal role in financial overplaying in the markets. 
 
“Affordable housing” and securitization 
Structured credit securities are products of the securitization process, which has served 
as the lynchpin of the financial markets since 1980s. Securitization allows the pooling of 
an individual loan with other loans. The pool of loans is then sold to a special purpose 
vehicle, SPV, which finances its purchase by issuing asset-backed securities (ABSs) in 
the market. As a result, the illiquid loans turn into securities, tradable in the financial 
market, allowing more capital to flow into the credit market. Securitization increases the 
liquidity of the original loan, lowering the credit cost and spreading the credit risk 
among market participants (Emilios 2007).  
Because of these presumed benefits, securitization was encouraged in the U.S. 
mortgage market. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bought mortgage loans from mortgage 
originators and securitized them into mortgage-backed securities, MBSs, allowing 
mortgage originators to have cash upfront and thus originate more mortgages. Mortgage 
loans bought by the two government-sponsored entities (GSEs), known as “conforming 
loans”, are mortgages for prime borrowers, and conform to the accepted underwriting 
standards. However, with the 1990s policy of more home ownership in the community, 
the two GSEs were encouraged to buy a wider range of loans, including some “sub-
prime loans”, which are mainly for borrowers of weak or incomplete credit histories in 
the market (Randall, 2007). This gave more sub-prime borrowers the chance to borrow 
mortgage loans and own a house, and as a result the number of sub-prime mortgages 
significantly increased (see Figure 2). The number of structured credit securities backed 
by sub-prime mortgage loans also accelerated (see Figure 3). 
This securitization process totally changed the traditional lending model. After 
being originated, loans were repackaged and distributed in the market as asset-backed 
securities. Therefore, this model is also known as the “originate-to-distribute” (OTD) 
model. Under the OTD model, investment banks and other financial institutions are the 
main capital suppliers for the credit market, particularly in the mortgage market, through 
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Figure 2: Sub-prime Share in Total 
Mortgage Originations 
Figure 3: Percent Sub-prime Securitized 
  
Source: Adapted from Inside Mortgage Finance (2007) 
 
The question is why investors were willing to buy investment instruments backed by 
those sub-prime mortgage loans. The answer lies in the financial innovation and the 
hands-off approach of regulatory bodies. The use of financial innovation allowed 
investment banks and other financial intermediaries to change those sub-prime 
mortgages into investment-grade securities. As stated, such innovative instruments 
included off-balance-sheet entities (OBSEs) such as SPVs, SIVs, and financial conduits 
that grew exponentially in a lightly regulated environment. 
 
Lightly regulated Off-Balance-Sheet Entities (OBSEs)  
OBSEs take a variety of forms, depending on the financing method and investment 
portfolios. An SPV would be established by investment banks as an independent 
company to execute the purchase of loans from banks, as mentioned above. SPVs 
repackage those loans, sliding them into tranches and issuing ABSs with different 
seniorities and rating quality in the market (see Figure 4). The upper tranches, known as 
“senior tranches”, are the safest tranches, with a priority claim on the payment of the 
originated loans, and receiving the highest rating. The lower tranches are more risky, and 
offer higher returns. A SPV removes originated loans from the balance sheets of banks, 
collecting principal and interest cash flows from the underlying assets and passing them 
on to the owners of the various tranches. Meanwhile, if banks want to invest indirectly in 
ABSs, they would establish SIVs to invest in senior tranches by issuing asset-backed 
commercial papers (ABCPs). SIVs allow the repackaging of a pool of loans to provide 
more complex structured credit products like CDOs, or they facilitate the re-
securitization to make CDOs squared, as illustrated in Figure 5. As a result, the 
originated sub-prime mortgage loans turn into a bunch of investment-grade securities in 
the market through the use of innovative investment instruments.  
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Figure 4: SPV Securitization – Basic Design 
 
 
Though established as separate entities, SPVs and SIVs required a credit-enhancement 
or liquidity-support commitment from a well-established banks; or financial institutions 
called sponsors to earn a AAA rating from credit-rating agencies. However, in the 
process, liquidity-support commitment exposed the sponsor bank to the liquidity risk of 
OBSEs. Sponsor banks made gross misuse of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) rules, which allowed 
the disclosure of related OBSEs by sponsor banks to be voluntary at best (UITF 2008). 
The lighter regulation resulted in the increased use of OBSEs by banks to hide risks and 
leverage in securitization activities: they removed loans from their balance sheets and 
recycled capital through securitization to generate new loans. Banks would also invest 
indirectly in high-yielding, longer-maturity debt like ABSs without worrying about the 
capital-adequacy requirements. Meanwhile, banks enjoyed remarkable revenue for 
establishing and running those OBSEs. 
 




Source: Multi-Layered Structured Credit Products Adapted from IMF Global Stability Report 
(2008) 
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Lack of disclosure prevented the exact estimation of the growth of these instruments. 
However, according to an IMF report (2008), the recent growth of SIVs was mainly seen 
in mortgage products and CDOs. These assets were estimated to comprise over half  of 
the SIV’s assets. In the 10-K form (an annual filing of companies listed on the U.S stock 
exchanges required by the SEC) filed for the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in 2007, Citigroup disclosed that it had $774.1 billion in qualified special purpose 
entities (QSPEs), in which mortgages accounted for nearly 79%.  
 
Unbridled structured credit products  
Structured credit products and credit derivatives help spread credit risks among the 
market participants. In the conventional lending model, the lender had to assume all 
credit risks involved in originated loans. However, as loans are divided into tranches 
with different risk and return trade-offs, and sold in the market as securities, the scheme 
allowed different types of investors to hold different parts of the capital structure of 
those products. Due to the complex structure of the products, the valuation is primarily 
based on the credit rating and their liquidity in the market; as a result, banks faced 
heightened liquidity risk, and downgraded the risk of those structured credit securities 
even when investing in super senior tranches 
 
Excessive liquidity and demand for innovative financial instruments  
In this section we shall explain the connection between excessive liquidity in financial 
markets in the past years and deregulations in the market during the same period. 
 
Low interest rate  
The interest rate was maintained at a low level in U.S. after the dotcom bubble burst in 
2000, and following September 11, 2001, to boost consumption in the economy. Low 
interest rates encouraged borrowing and lending activities in the market, resulting in 
more credit and liquidity being available for investment. Therefore, market participants, 
especially lightly-regulated but highly-leveraged hedge funds and private equity funds, 
sought higher-risk and higher-yield investment instruments (Michel 2007), leading to 
more demand for lower-tranch MBSs and CDOs. 
 
The abolition of the Glass-Steagall Act  
The Act was brought into force in the 1930s to separate commercial banking and 
investment banking. However, in 1999, this segmentation was abolished, allowing the 
creation of financial holding companies that could engage in a wider range of banking 
activities, including securities and insurance (James 2000). As a result, investment banks 
enjoyed more capital injection into the market from depository institutions (The 
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Economist, October 18, 2008). The removal significantly increased the capital and 
liquidity available for investment in the market. 
 
Deregulation in the Derivatives Market  
In 2000, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) was introduced, removing 
many regulatory requirements in the derivatives market. By removing regulations in the 
energy and commodity trading market, the CFMA encouraged greater speculative 
trading and higher leverage in the derivatives market. 
 
Implied guarantees  
Investment banks have been lightly regulated, with a lower capital-adequacy ratio and a 
higher-leverage level than other depository institutions. With the consent of the SEC in 
2004 (Stephen 2008), the leverage ratio in the five biggest investment banks before the 
crisis was always maintained at around 35:1. The high leverage allowed investment 
banks to participate in risky investments with low equity requirements, earning higher 
profits. At the same time, these investment banks enjoyed an implied guarantee from the 
SEC in case of default, similar to other heavily-regulated depository institutions. The 
$30 billion rescue package from the Federal Government in the case of Bear Stearns in 
February 2008 is one example of this implied guarantee (Nouriel 2008).  
 Similarly, other non-depository financial institutions benefited from 
innovative financial instruments in a numbers of ways, including: 
 
-    Allowing more credit to be available to borrowers (household and corporate) 
- Decreasing the cost of capital in the market.  
- Providing more instruments for hedging and managing risk, and 
- Providing a wider selection of investment instruments.  
 
Financial Innovation and Financial Market Turmoil 
 
A closer reading of the report of the President’s Working Group on Financial Market 
(PWG 2008) shows that the sub-prime crisis is symptomatic of much broader erosion of 
market discipline. The default of a large number of sub-prime loans in the market during 
2007 was the trigger for a financial calamity that was in the making for more than a 
decade, caused by unregulated innovative investment instruments and shabby lending 
practices by financial and investment institutions. In the following sections we will 
explain the linkages between financial innovation and the recent financial market 
turmoil piece by piece. 
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Originate-to-distribute practices 
Financial innovation without proper regulation led to the sustained erosion of market 
discipline, as explained earlier. This trend is traced in an earlier study, but that study falls 
short of explaining the mechanics of the relationship (Kregel 2008). Lax underwriting 
standards in the mortgage market provided an obvious example of a shabby financial 
model designed around the originate-to-distribute principle (OTD). The OTD model 
helped to spread risks and reduce financing costs for market participants. However, the 
transferring of the underlying assets in the OTD model led to a separation between the 
risk-monitor and the risk-bearer. Under the conventional lending model, commercial 
banks kept originated loans in their balance sheets, reflecting the credit risk in toto. 
Therefore, they were motivated to verify the borrower’s creditworthiness and avoided 
risky loans. This motivation disappeared in the new OTD model, where loan originators 
would easily sell the originated loans to packagers and pass the risk on to other 
participants in the market. Moreover, loan originators were motivated by misaligned 
incentives, as their revenues depended not on the quality of such loans, but on the 
quantity (Emilios 2008). The more mortgages they originated, the more they earn. 
Investment banks engaged in a wide range of non-conventional practices related to the 
securitization process, like originating a mortgage, securitizing it, servicing the 
securitized structure, and providing insurance.  
Adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM) also grew significantly (see Table 1). 
According to Kregel (2008),  
 
… the first report of the State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group (2008) hints that 
weak or non-existent underwriting … [gave rise to] loans that had no reasonable 
prospect of being repaid … Many loans were originated on the basis of the borrower’s 
declaration of income, with no verification of income, assets, or employment.  
 
The results of reckless lending could be seen as early as 2007, when many ARM loan 
rates were reset to a gradually rising interest rate. According to the Global Financial 
Stability Report (2008), as of the third quarter of 2007, 43% of foreclosures were on 
sub-prime ARMs. The default rate of non-prime loans was forecast to stay around 30% 
till 2009 (see Table 2). 
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Table 1: Sub-prime Loans 




2001 73.8% 0.0% 28.5% 39.7% 
2002 80.0% 2.3% 38.6% 40.1% 
2003 80.1% 8.6% 42.8% 40.5% 
2004 89.4% 27.2% 45.2% 41.2% 
2005 93.3% 37.8% 50.7% 41.8% 
2006 91.3% 22.8% 50.8% 42.4% 
Source: Inside Mortgage Finance (2007), adapted from International Monetary Fund 
 
These loans were given on the premise that real estate prices would keep rising and 
interest rates would be kept low (Kregel 2008). In other words, such loans were given on 
the basis of the borrowers’ ability to refinance, not their capacity to pay back. During the 
stable era, the default rate was low; however, in the volatile era, the default rate on such 
sub-prime loans rapidly accelerated.  
 
Table 2: Current Delinquency Rates for Sub-prime and Alt-A Loan  
Quarter for First payment Rest 30+ Days Past Due (%) 
4
th
 Quarter 2007 32.4% 
1
st
 Quarter 2008 32.5% 
2
nd
 Quarter 2008 34.2% 
3
rd
 Quarter 2008 35.5% 
4
th
 Quarter 2008 35.4% 
1
st
 Quarter 2009 30.5% 
2nd Quarter 2009 22.9% 
Average 31.9% 
Source: Adapted from State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group (2008) 
 
Off-Balance-Sheet Entities and risk concealing 
Securitization was widely used for transferring risks. However, many banks didn’t fully 
grasp the risks inherent in the model. As the crisis broke out, it was revealed that 
although banks and financial institutions had intentionally used OBSEs for transferring 
risks, they were still exposed to significant risks involving structured credit securities. 
Some banks retained super senior tranches of CDOs in their balance sheets due to the 
low demand for those low-risk and low-return tranches. With the onset of the sub-prime 
crisis, the value of those products quickly evaporated due to the illiquidity of the market. 
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Banks were now exposed to big losses as a result of holding even presumably safer or 
highly-rated tranches; at the same time, they were supposed to provide liquidity support 
for SIVs as committed. Investors soon started to realize the hollowness of the ABCPs, 
issued by SIVs and backed by RMBS and CDOs, and started to withdraw from the 
ABCP market in droves. As a result, ABCPs couldn’t be rolled over, leading to the 
sudden drying-up of the ABCP market; which, in turn, brought many large U.S. and 
European financial institutions under liquidity pressure (PWG 2008). During the 
summer of 2007, Citigroup had to purchase $25 billion in commercial paper issued by 
some of its SIVs. By December 2007, Citigroup bailed out six SIVs with an asset total 
of $49 billion (IMF 2008). The consolidation of OBSE instruments on the sponsors’ 
balance sheets caused greater controversy in an already volatile market, creating more 
confusion. And still the regulators allowed the disclosure of OBSEs on a voluntary basis 
(IMF 2008). Due to the lack of transparency, in the financial turmoil investors felt 
uncertain about the real exposure of banks to OBSEs and structured credit products, 
leading to their large-scale withdrawal from the market. 
 
Lack of disclosure and valuation uncertainty 
As discussed earlier, the complexity of structured credit products makes them hard to 
value (see Figure 5). Meanwhile, very little information on those products was disclosed 
in the physical market place, since most CDOs were traded over the counter. Investors 
mainly relied on credit ratings and the liquidity of those products to value them; as a 
consequence, CDOs and CLOs easily lost their value in an illiquid market.  
Credit-rating agencies played an important role in the performance of structured 
credit products. Institutional as well as individual investors depended extensively on 
credit ratings for evaluating the risk in structured credit products, as these products were 
often too complex to be tracked otherwise (PWG 2008). However, the crisis has shown 
that there are great flaws in the credit-rating model used for structured credit securities. 
The conflict of interest between credit-rating agencies and the suppliers of ABSs and 
CDOs also brought into focus the controversial discussion of the quality of credit ratings. 
A detailed discussion of the role of credit-rating agencies leading up to the financial 
market turmoil can be found in the report of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions Technical Committee (2008). 
 
High leverage and cyclical lending 
Securitization allowed banks and financial institutions to originate more loans without 
additional capital reserves to compensate for heightened leverage. Banks got cash 
upfront and plowed it back into new lending, which created a cyclical lending pattern in 
the credit market. Meanwhile, the financial leverage of the whole system rapidly 
- 66 - 
 
increased. As discussed above, the leverage ratio in the five biggest investment banks 
before the crisis was around 35:1. This number was much higher for unregulated hedge 
funds in the market. OBSEs effectively concealed the real leverage level of sponsoring 
banks. Many ABCP investors also used ABCPs as collateral for borrowing investment 
capital in the market; as a result, the whole financial system, including the commercial 
and corporate lending sector, was highly leveraged and more vulnerable to crisis.  
 
Implications and Regulatory Recommendations 
 
Financial markets around the globe are very complex and interconnected. The sub-prime 
crisis of 2007 rolled into a global financial meltdown due to a loss of confidence in 
financial institutions and innovative financial instruments among investors. However, 
the collapse in confidence stemmed from the lack of transparency in financial markets. 
After a decade of the deregulation era, financial markets had become more opaque, with 
complex structured credit products and lightly disclosed investment instruments. The 
lack of a prudential regulatory framework facilitated many financial institutions to abuse 
innovative instruments to earn financial excess without any real capital capacity. This 
hands-off approach allowed banks to hide their risk-exposure levels by using OBSEs and 
other, even riskier investment models.  
 
Regulatory recommendations 
There should be no doubt about introducing regulation and oversight in financial 
markets after having gone through such a financial calamity, in which a lack of 
regulation appears to be the main culprit. It appears that the Obama administration in the 
US is committed to reinforcing the oversight of financial markets, though their plan for 
modernizing the financial regulatory system emphasizes the monitoring of the market 
through its own dynamics. However, the complexity of recent financial models and 
products, and the integration of the financial market, still pose challenges for regulatory 
bodies in terms of catching up with developments in the market. In recognition of this, 
the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (2008) and the Financial Stability 
Forum (2008) suggested that the following would be minimum requirements for any 
sustained and systematic improvement to take place: 
- Strengthening prudential oversight of the capital, liquidity, and risk  management 
of banks and financial institutions  
- Enhancing disclosure with respect to off-balance-sheet entities  
- Enhancing transparency in the securitization process and markets, and 
- Reforming credit-rating agencies’ processes and practices, particularly 
 concerning structured credit products. 
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A comprehensive regulatory framework is necessary to protect the interests of related 
market participants as well as to restore confidence among investors. However, the 
regulation process should proceed carefully so as not to distort the independence of 




Financial innovation has enjoyed significant growth in a lightly-regulated financial 
market, spearheaded by deregulation as a result of Reaganomics since the early 1980s. 
Innovative instruments including the structured credit securities ABSs, CDOs and CDSs, 
and other off-balance-sheet entities such as SPVs and SIVs greatly supported the 
development and expansion of the financial markets. They enhanced credit availability 
in the market, thereby lowering credit costs and increasing efficiency.  
However, the growth of unregulated financial innovation facilitated by reckless 
deregulation has made global financial markets less transparent and less stable, leading 
to the recent financial crisis. The misuse of innovative instruments included the 
securitization of sub-prime loans in the mortgage market, lightly-regulated off-balance-
sheet entities, and unregulated structured credit products. The growth of ABSs, CDOs, 
and SIVs without prudential regulation distorted the transparency of the market. The 
deregulation era resulted in opaque financial markets with highly-leveraged financial 
institutions and complex structured credit products. A comprehensive regulatory system 
is necessary to put markets on the right track again and to restore investor confidence. 
While Asian markets in general and the Japanese market in particular have had 
their own fair share of recent miseries in the form of the bubble of the 1980s and the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997, this time, too, they were not totally spared. The impact on 
these markets, however latent it might have been across various markets, was no less of 
a problem this time, either. Although these markets should have been better prepared due 
to their earlier experiences, we found that greater connectivity between U.S. and Asia-
Pacific markets made them prone to all the investment fallacies and market 
mismanagement that was happening in the U.S. It is clear beyond doubt that the 
Reagonomics that led to uncontrolled and at times shabby financial products in the name 
of innovation did not solely impact the financial markets and the financial system within 
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